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By Joseph S. Fichera and Rebecca Klein
Released in 2007
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In the wake of natural disasters, higher energy prices,
increased grid congestion and an escalating desire for lower greenhouse gas
emissions, securitization is gaining greater popularity among state regulators
as a lower‑cost substitute to pay for capital‑intensive
infrastructure investments.
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Securitization is gaining greater popularity among
state regulators as a lower cost substitute to pay for capital‑intensive
infrastructure investments.
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Major investments for plants,
transmission and distribution, and even “rainy day” funds (also known as
reserve funds) for unforeseeable energy “events” are a growing burden for
electricity ratepayers in many states across the country. Since 1995, ratepayer securitization (also known
as ratepayer obligation bonds, securitization bonds, and utility tariff bonds)
has been used with increasing frequency among state utility commissions to pay
for the heavy investments necessary for these statewide energy benefits.
Securitization is the process of
selling to investors high‑quality, highly rated securities through
special purpose, bankruptcy‑remote entities. Typically, a company transfers property with
a dependable cash flow to a special purpose entity (SPE) through a “true sale.” For purposes of achieving the necessary legal
protections under federal bankruptcy law, a true sale is achieved through an
absolute transfer of the company’s entire right, title, and interest in the property
to the SPE, a legally distinct party, for fair market value, with the company
retaining no residual ownership interest in the property.
The SPE then issues bonds and pledges the transferred
property to secure the payment of debt service on the bonds. The transferred property can be either
tangible or intangible. For example, the
transferred property might be a physical asset (e.g., a plant), an
intellectual asset (e.g., a patent), or an intangible asset (e.g.,
the right to a particular revenue stream), which is the property at issue in
ratepayer‑backed bonds.
Securitization therefore creates a separate and independent
credit based on the risk associated with the cash flows from the pledged
property that supports the payment of principal and interest to investors. As a result, securitized debt instruments do
not burden the assets or revenues of the company and instead are payable solely
from the pledged property. The bonds are
not a charge against the credit of the parent company, but the parent company
gets full use of the proceeds.
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The bonds are not a charge against the credit of the
parent company but the parent company gets full use of the proceeds.
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State legislatures, public
utility commissions, and investor‑owned utilities have used securitization
to raise funds for several different purposes in the public interest. To date, securitization has been used or is
pending to fund energy conservation programs, environmental control facilities,
electric power purchase costs, hurricane‑ related damage, and stranded
costs arising from deregulation.
A defining and common feature of these securitization transactions
is that they all have been made possible by specific enabling state legislation
that establishes a legal framework for the creation of a new type of intangible
property right under state law. This
includes an irrevocable regulatory guarantee to always adjust rates to whatever
level is necessary to ensure timely payment of debt service on the bonds known
as the true‑up adjustment process.
In general, this new, intangible property will initially be owned by the
utility. Like any other property owned
by the utility, this new property can be pledged as collateral in a financing. In this case, the property created is the
right to bill, charge, and collect a specific charge on some or all retail
electricity consumers in a given electricity transmission and distribution
service territory.
The enabling legislation also allows utility commissions
to issue irrevocable financing orders that segregate a component of the retail rate
charged to consumers throughout the territory; cause the right to receive this
rate component to be treated as a present interest in property that can be
bought, sold, and pledged; authorize the utility to sell this property to a bankruptcy‑remote
SPE; authorize the SPE to issue debt instruments secured by a first priority lien
on this property, including the right to the true‑up adjustment process;
and require the utility to use net proceeds from the transaction for specified
purposes.
There have been 37 issues of securitized utility bonds
since 1994 totaling more than $38 billion.
In none of these transactions has the utility or its shareholders been
responsible for any portion of the costs or charges associated with securitized
bonds. Consequently, the financing is unlike
any of the utility’s other obligations. The
economic burden of repaying these securitized bonds falls squarely on the
ratepayers in the service territory; hence, the securities are aptly referred
to as “ratepayer‑backed” bonds.
Initially, ratepayer‑backed bonds were issued primarily
for the recovery of stranded costs in states that had deregulated their
electricity markets. In 2004–06,
ratepayer‑backed bonds began to be used for purposes other than the
recovery of stranded costs. Certain
state governments and their regulators authorized their use for refinancing of
a bankruptcy‑related regulatory asset (California), unrecovered electric power
purchase costs (New Jersey), environmental facilities (Wisconsin and West
Virginia), buy‑downs from contracts with independent power producers
(Vermont), storm cost recovery (Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi), and any
corporate purpose (Idaho).
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Initially ratepayer‑backed bonds were issued
primarily for the recovery of stranded costs in states that had deregulated
their electricity markets.
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A utility fee securitization is
therefore a unique form of utility corporate debt financing. A significant advantage of securitization is
that the credit quality of the future revenue stream will be much higher
(generally triple‑A) than that of parties associated with the
transaction, thereby obtaining significantly lower interest rates than would
otherwise be available because of the better credit rating.
Another significant advantage of securitization is that it
is nonrecourse to the parent and protects the credit quality of the parent. Shareholders get an improved balance sheet
and more headroom in rates for other financings that may earn an equity return. Thus, securitization is an efficient form of
off‑balance‑sheet financing that has the potential of gaining the
most favorable cost of funds from the capital markets with benefits for
ratepayers and shareholders.
A typical utility tariff
securitization program is simple and straightforward and, because of its structure,
is not an “asset‑backed security” but a unique government‑sponsored
credit. Fundamentally, a utility tariff
bond program does the following:
·
Imposes a nonbypassable charge (based on electricity
consumption) on the electric bill of all retail electric consumers in a utility’s
transmission and distribution service territory
·
Collects the charge and turns it over to a
special purpose, bankruptcy‑remote entity to pay principal and interest
on the bonds
·
Guarantees that the government will adjust the
charge at least annually to guarantee sufficient funds to pay principal and
interest and all expenses of the transaction on time

The charge is termed nonbypassable in that customers
cannot avoid paying it by switching service providers or through self‑generation. The charge is required by law or regulation
to be set and continually adjusted to a level to guarantee the payment of
principal and interest on the bonds and all expenses of the transaction. The state and the commission also give
bondholders a specific pledge never to interfere with their rights to receive
payments on the bonds.
Parties To Transaction
Exhibit 1
represents the parties to the transactions underlying the offering of a typical
utility tariff securitization. It
describes their roles and relationships to the other parties. There are a number of different variations on
this structure that utilities and their regulators could employ depending on
the needs of the parties.
Precedents Are Many
Exhibit 2
is a list of state and utility issues involving tariff‑backed debt.
Ratepayer Savings and Shareholder Benefits
There are two basic sources of economic benefits (see Exhibit 3 for an example). First, significant savings occur when
utilities use ratepayer‑backed bonds to replace conventional utility debt
and equity financing. It is effectively off‑balance‑sheet
and nonrecourse to the utility. The
utility and its shareholders are fully protected. This means that the utility can finance the
asset or expense in question with nearly 100 percent debt rather than its
normal capital mix of about 50 percent debt and 50 percent equity without
any impairment of its credit structure.
The ratepayer savings are even greater for a utility that
has a high equity level in its capital structure. The cost of equity is much higher than the
cost of debt. A 5 percent cost of
debt and an 11 percent cost of equity are typical values in today’s
environment. In addition, savings occur
by the avoidance of income taxes that would otherwise have to be paid on the
equity return. These savings accrue
directly to the ratepayers in the form of lower overall rates than would
otherwise be levied.
Second, these ratepayer‑backed bonds save in the
capital markets commensurate with their extremely high credit quality. In general, the better the credit rating, the
lower the interest cost. By separating
the operating utility from the issuer of the bonds (a so‑called
bankruptcy remote entity) and isolating the cash flow with the guarantee of the
commission to always adjust the charge to repay the bonds, the credit rating agencies
associated with ratepayer‑backed investors will evaluate the bonds as
independent of the utility and independent of the traditional debt of the
utility. Conventional utility debt has numerous
risks associated with its repayment. Those
risks will not be present in connection with ratepayer‑backed bonds.

Furthermore, and most important,
the broad‑based charge will be imposed on substantially all retail
electric consumers in a utility’s service area, and the charge will be
automatically adjusted periodically to whatever level is necessary to repay the
bonds on time over the life of the bonds, as required by the enabling statute
and a commission order. Thus, so long as
the charge does not exceed 20 percent of the bundled rate to consumers,
the bonds will be rated “AAA.” This
category is the top in the credit‑rating system.
The savings commensurate with this top quality credit in
the capital markets are not automatic. Not
all AAA‑rated bonds price or trade at the same yield. There are a number of steps that are required
at the time ratepayer‑backed bonds are structured, marketed, and priced. These steps will achieve the lowest cost
available consistent with market conditions at the time of pricing and capture
the full economic value of the unique government guarantees embodied in the
legislation and the irrevocable nature of the financing order.
Because the bonds require more structuring than
traditional corporate bonds, transaction costs are higher. This need not be an obstacle to the issuance
of the bonds. Rather, it requires more diligence
and work on the part of regulators and companies to identify cost savings and
economies of scale during the transaction process. Regulators and companies need to think about
statewide initiatives and coordination of efforts to reduce burdens on all
ratepayers. Exhibit 4 is a map of states with enabling legislation.
Finally, in approaching the structure, marketing, and
pricing of the bonds, utilities and regulators should see it as an active
partnership. Each side brings an
important perspective to the negotiation and each side needs to be empowered to
cooperate in making decisions that serve the economic interests of each of
their constituencies. A joint decision‑making
process will preserve the integrity of the ultimate outcome for shareholders
and ratepayers.

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